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Abstract 
This paper seeks to provide an overview of how companies assess and manage security risks 
in practice. For this purpose we referred to data of security surveys to examine the scope of 
risk analysis and to identify involved entities in this process. Our analysis shows a continuous 
focus on data system security rather than on real world organizational context as well as a 
prevalent involvement of top management and security staff in risk analysis process and in 
security policy definition and implementation. We therefore suggest that three issues need to 
be further investigated in the field of information security risk management in order to bridge 
the gap between design and implementation of secure and usable systems. First, there is a need 
to broaden the horizon to consider information system as human activity system which is 
different from a data processing system. Second, the involvement of relevant stakeholders in 
context for risk analysis leads to better appreciation of security risks. Third, it is necessary to 
develop ad-hoc tools and techniques to facilitate discussions and dialogue between 
stakeholders in risk analysis context.  
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1. Introduction 
Security surveys published in many countries by professional bodies provide an 
overview of security practices of companies. The analysis of these surveys also 
provides opportunities to reflect on ways how companies deal with increasing 
security risks. This paper considers three security surveys published in USA, UK and 
France. Hence, the focus will be not just on describing security practices, but, rather, 
on the identification of gaps in such practices and alternative perspectives for better 
management of security risks. In fact, the trend towards social networking, BYOD 
and cloud computing technologies among other factors has increased security 
vulnerabilities and threats. 
The key findings of several security surveys reveal that companies are struggling to 
keep up with security risks (e.g. The Global State of Information Security Survey, 
2014; 2015; Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2014; 2015). In particular, 
enterprises experience difficulties in assessing and managing their security risks, 
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applying appropriate security controls, as well as preventing security threats. These 
findings also indicate that security controls and procedures deployed by enterprises 
cannot match the requirements of their real business processes. 
We argue in this paper that two reasons could potentially explain the poor 
effectiveness of the implemented security solutions and procedures: the boundary 
problem of risk analysis scope and the background of involved actors in risk 
assessment and in security policy design. The drive for change is three-fold: first, we 
realized that security surveys are adopting a formal approach of security and are 
confusing information systems security with data systems security; second, we can 
draw a correlation between this perspective and security practices patterns; and third, 
we provide alternative perspectives on the process and practice of security risk 
management to handle an effective alignment of security controls with business 
requirements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in three sections. The first section introduces 
related literature in practice-based information systems security (ISS). The second 
section reports key findings of security surveys in USA, UK and France. The third 
section discusses identified gaps in security practices and proposes alternative 
perspectives to address deficiencies in security design and implementation. The 
conclusion sets up a research agenda for potential future works.  
2. Background  
In the ISS literature, a wealth of prior research sheds light on many ways that 
organizations can use to take into consideration contextual factors such as national 
culture as (Yildirima et al., 2011), organizational structure and culture, management 
support, training and awareness, users’ participation in the formulation process, 
business objectives, legal and regulatory requirements (Karyda et al., 2005; Knapp et 
al., 2009). Another focus of attention of ISS researches has been the compliance of 
employees to security procedures and guidelines viewed from behavioral perspective 
and applying socio-cognitive theories (Herath and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Vance 
et al., 2012; Shropshire et al., 2015).  
It is also acknowledged that security measures which are modeled outside of the real 
world organizational context are prone to antagonize effective organizational 
practices and the literature maintains a plethora of such real world cases. In the case 
study conducted by Kolkowska and Dhillon (2013), the workers noted that “The 
checks and balances that have been built into the system are not necessarily the way 
in which any of the case-workers operate”. By failing to appreciate the complex 
relationships between use, usability and usefulness, security procedures imposed are 
not only subject to possible misuse but they are likely to be a core hindrance to 
everyday legitimate work. Albrechtsen (2007) has furthermore identified that an 
increased security workload might create difficulties for work functionality and 
efficiency. The author also noticed a trivial effect of documented requirements of 
expected information security behaviour and general awareness campaigns on user 
behaviour and awareness. The study of Parsons et al., (2014) has also noticed the 
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lack of efficiency of generic courses based on a lecture on knowledge of security 
policy and procedure.  
The weakest link is not necessarily in the (technical) system itself but the difference 
between the formal model of usage and real usage of system content (data) as such in 
a human activity system. Consequently, designers have to find a balance between 
security, performance and usability (Sommerville, 2011) and IT specialists should 
also continue to work on methods that minimize inconvenience and delays (Oz and 
Jones, 2008).  
The implementation of a security policy is also expected to change organisational 
procedures and practices as well as to shape and monitor the behavior of employees, 
through education and training, to ensure compliance with security requirements. 
Bocij et al., (2008) argued for the formulation of a comprehensive policy on security 
in order to ensure employees adhesion to policy guidelines. Albrechtsen and Hovden 
(2010) discussed ways in which security awareness and behaviour may be improved 
and changed through dialogue, participation and collective reflection. In addition, 
one line of solution is to enhance the situational awareness that involves an 
intelligence-driven process to systematically collect and analyse security risk data 
prior to decision-making (Webb et al., 2014; Franke and Brynielsson, 2014). 
To attempt to explain why deficiencies in the practice of information security risk 
assessment occur, a stream in ISS research has focused on the background of 
involved actors in risk analysis and security policy processes. For example, Samela 
(2008) pointed out that business process analysis is an understudied approach when 
it comes to assess ISS risks. In most of the companies, professionals with operational 
knowledge pertinent to risk analysis are not efficiently involved (Shedden et al., 
2011). Therefore, there is a need to conduct risk analysis activities by business 
process owners (Coles and Moulton, 2003). Taking several researches 
recommendations that emphasize the centrality of human and social issues in 
information security, Reece and Stahl (2015) have discussed new areas of 
competences that can potentially be used to found a new claim of professional 
identity of information security practitioner. The authors recommend including 
particular skills and knowledge in undergraduate socialisation and training.   
In order to demonstrate the importance and necessity of the contextual dimension in 
the design of a secure information system, the study of Spears and Barki (2010) 
provides a particular application of this view in the context of regulatory compliance 
and confirms the conclusion that the engagement of users in ISS risk management 
process contributes to more effective security measures and better alignment of 
security controls with business objectives. A systemic and value-focused view of 
security would result in a better understanding of organizational stakeholders of the 
role and application of security functions in situated practices and an achievement of 
contextually relevant risk analysis (Bednar and Katos, 2009; Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 
2006). Therefore, a holistic security strategy needs to include human aspects as a 
core part of secure and usable systems (Furnell and Clarke, 2012).   
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3. Existing practices 
While information security risks have evolved and financial costs of cybercrime have 
increased, security practices and strategies have not adequately kept up with dynamic 
and challenging attacks that are highly complex and difficult to detect.  
According to the PwC-US (2014), CLUSIF (2014) and PwC-UK (2014) reports an 
important percentage of the interviewed enterprises have proceeded to the 
formalization of their security policies. However, the existence of a security policy 
by itself does not mean its efficient implementation or relevance. In the case of the 
UK businesses, only a quarter of respondents with a security policy believe their staff 
have a very good understanding of it. Moreover, 70% of companies where security 
policy was poorly understood had staff-related breaches versus 41% where the policy 
was well understood.  
As to security risk analysis, although there is a wide consensus that security is a high 
priority PwC-US (2014) report shows that only 38% align their security spending 
with business strategy and most of the interviewed enterprises do not implement the 
tools and processes necessary for a comprehensive assessment. In PwC-UK (2014), 
20% of the respondents have not carried out any form of security risk assessment and 
many organisations still struggle to evaluate the effectiveness of their deployed 
security controls. In addition, an organization needs to classify its information assets 
in accordance to their business value and sensitivity in order to ensure an effective 
protection. Information assets inventories and classification help organizations to 
perform security risk assessment and to delimit the required protection levels as well 
as to ensure cost effectiveness of implemented security measures. In the case of US 
businesses, only 17% classify the business value of data. PwC-UK (2014) report 
indicates that large organisations seem to struggle to clearly define responsibilities 
for owning critical data and for protecting it. Also 20% said the responsibilities are 
not clear and, none believe the responsibilities were very clear. Discussions with 
senior management and views of internal security experts remain the most popular 
other sources for evaluating cyber threats. Large organisations rely on external 
security consultants and alerts from government/intelligence services. 
In France, Clusif (2014) provides an extensive overview of security practices of 350 
companies and 150 hospitals. Table 1 illustrates that a relatively large (47%) 
percentage of enterprises and hospitals (41%) do not carry any risk analysis. This 
could be related in some extent to the lack of data classification which is a necessary 
input to risk analysis process.   
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 Data inventory Risk analysis 
Companies  Hospitals Companies Hospitals 
Yes, totally 31% 17% 21% 19% 
Partly, data system 14% 30% 22% 27% 
Partly, data jobs 21% 25% 8% 13% 
No  32% 25% 47% 41% 
 Table 1: Percentage of enterprises and hospitals carrying out data classification 
and risk analysis, adapted from Clusif (2014) 
Another aspect comes out this table is when a data inventory is achieved, it is clearly 
focusing on data system as data related to particular activities or jobs are mostly 
overlooked. 
Delving into the background or organizational position of involved entities in risk 
analysis and security policy formulation reveals some interesting findings. For 
companies, Clusif survey respondents report a significant influence of top 
management and IS directorate on security policy definition. In table 2, only 12% of 
respondents involve directors of business activities such as marketing or production 
in security policy design. Parsing further Clusif data, we noticed that the hierarchical 
reporting of ISS executive belongs to IS directorate in 46 % of the cases and to top 
management in 27 %.    
 Security policy Risk analysis 
Top Management 50% - 
IS Directorate 54% - 
ISS Executive 39% 56% 
Job Director 12% 12% 
Table 2: Involved entities in risk analysis and security policy definition, adapted 
from Clusif (2014) 
When it comes to areas of risk mitigation, most organizations are still focused on 
updating their technologies and providing more training and education for staff to 
guarantee more compliance to security policy guidelines as well as the formalization 
of the security organizational procedures to have more “standardized behavior” 
(PwC-UK, 2014; Clusif, 2014). This leads to the conclusion of the predominance of 
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technical and formalized paradigm in the development and implementation of IS 
security policies and procedures. 
4. Discussion 
A comprehensive review of security surveys has highlighted a number of gaps in 
security practices. Essentially, we consider that the distinction between IS as a 
data processing system and IS as a human activity system provides a frame of 
reference to explain the reasons why the gaps in matching security practices to 
organizational and business needs continue to be relevant issues to explore in IS 
security research. Therefore, we first argue for broadening the scope of security risk 
analysis; Second, involving relevant stakeholders in context and third further 
investigating techniques and methods to allow discussion and develop understanding 
of security risks in uncertain and complex environment.  
The data centric focus in ISS practices influences work practices and creates 
unintended consequences and changes in a human activity design instead of being a 
part of its design. The prevalence of centralized security controls and related top-
down management are challenged by dynamic business and technological 
environments. Basing security risk analysis solely on data system, and ignoring 
human activity system, means that misleading assumptions about rational and 
irrational behaviour of users may explain many security measures failure. If security 
policy and procedures were developed as an add-on to the real world business 
practices it is quite possibly the case that breach of security policy may in some 
instances be necessary as in practice it might be the only way for an employee to do 
a good job. Filkins B. (2013) illustrates this misfit in the case of the help desk 
services which are not consider enough in risk analysis scope even though they could 
be a vulnerable entry point to conduct social engineering attacks or to disclosure 
sensitive data.  
Taking a proactive approach to develop a holistic security strategy, systemic risk 
analysis requires attention be paid to the background of involved actors in this 
process. The challenge of introducing security in a sensible and useful manner can be 
addressed by considering the contextual perspectives. By considering the human 
activity systems as a point of reference rather than a variable IS development process 
as an ongoing contextual inquiry (Bednar, 2000; 2007; Bednar and Welch, 2014) is 
characterized as an emergent systemic change process conducted through sense 
making and negotiations among relevant stakeholders. From a socio-technical 
perspective, it is claimed that a viable system would be more user-centric by 
accommodating and balancing human processes rather than entertaining an 
expectation of a one sided change of behavior of the end user. 
As noted in security surveys, the involvement of security experts has been a 
significant input in many of the ISS models (Feng and Li, 2011; Ryan et al., 2012; 
Feng et al., 2014). However, the judgment of security risks cannot be only based on 
the security expert experience and knowledge, as the risk is contextually situated 
(Katos and Bednar, 2008). In practice, the evaluation of risk under uncertainty and 
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complexity requires the involvement of relevant stakeholders who make use of their 
own norms and values to set up the boundaries of a problem space. This leads to the 
generation of multi-perspectives and mutually inconsistent possible alternatives. 
Unique perspectives of individual stakeholders may be particularly important in 
highlighting aspects of a problem situation which may have become ‘invisible’ due 
to over-familiarity (Bednar and Welch, 2006). At a collective level, it is important to 
recognise and consider each individual’s unique perspectives without temptation to 
unify or integrate the differences in a shared understanding of a problem space, to 
seek a premature consensus or to set up an artificial imposed scale of agreement. 
To assist and facilitate assessment of risk with multi-value scales according to 
different stakeholders’ point of view, a potential interdisciplinary research area 
emerges to develop techniques and modelling support for analysis aiming at inquiries 
into uncertain and complex problems spaces. In this setting, the SST framework 
(Bednar, 2000) incorporates para-consistent logic, techniques for structuring 
uncertainty from multiple systemic perspectives and techniques for modelling 
diversity networks. Sadok et al., (2014) addressed the potential relevance of 
cognitive maps use in ISS context to support the exploration of individual 
understanding leading to richer elaboration of problem spaces. 
Being aware of the merits of sharing information and knowledge about security 
threats, the PwC-US (2014) report points up that 82% of companies with high-
performing security practices collaborate with others (e.g.	 third-party service 
providers and partners) to learn and to stimulate conversations about security risks  
and tactics. We argue in this paper that the exploration and understanding of security 
risks should equally involve internal stakeholders to better align security practices to 
business needs. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper aimed to shed light on key findings of security surveys in relation to risk 
analysis scope and involved actors. More fundamentally, deficiencies in security 
practices can be attributed to many reasons but it is relevant to include among them 
an exclusive technical focus and a top-down approach. Emphasising the centrality of 
human issues in information security, we highlight in this paper that the 
contextualization of security risk analysis as well as security policy design and 
implementation continue to be relevant and necessary research topics to explore. 
Questions about security failures in context could address the relevance of security 
policies and measures from professional stakeholders’ perspective as in many cases 
they work around security compliance or bypass security measures to effectively do 
the work. 
Rather than a dominant emphasis on technologies, for instance, it is essential to fund 
processes that fully bridge the gap between design and implementation of secure and 
usable systems through open discussion and dialogue between relevant stakeholders 
leading to better contextual appreciation of risks.  
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